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In this work we analyze the evolution of voluntary vaccination in networked populations by entangling the
spreading dynamics of an influenza-like disease with an evolutionary framework taking place at the end of each
influenza season so that individuals take or not the vaccine upon their previous experience. Our framework thus
put in competition two well-known dynamical properties of scale-free networks: the fast propagation of diseases
and the promotion of cooperative behaviors. Our results show that when vaccine is perfect scale-free networks
enhance the vaccination behavior with respect to random graphs with homogeneous connectivity patterns. How-
ever, when imperfection appears we find a cross-over effect so that the number of infected (vaccinated) individ-
uals increases (decreases) with respect to homogeneous networks, thus showing up the competition between the
aforementioned properties of scale-free graphs.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 05.70.Fh
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of network science [1, 2] has provided, an im-
portant set of computational and statistical physics tools for
describing the problem of epidemic spreading by incorporat-
ing the realistic interaction patterns of the constituents of so-
cial and technological systems [3]. Classical approaches to
epidemiology [4, 5] rely on the use of the theory of phase tran-
sitions and critical phenomena, so to unveil the onset and the
macroscopic impact of epidemic outbreaks. Recently, these
techniques have been pervasively adapted to study a variety
of critical phenomena on top of networks [6].
The main contribution of the former line of research to epi-
demiology has been the development of a generalized mean-
field framework in which general patterns of interactions can
be included. In particular, it was shown [7–12] that for scale-
free networks [in which the probability distribution of having
a node with k neighbors follows a power-law, P (k) ∼ k−α]
the epidemic onset was anticipated as compared to substrates
with more regular (or homogeneous) connectivity patterns.
Moreover, when α < 3 (as most of social and technologi-
cal networks show [13, 14]) and for large enough (thermody-
namic limit) systems, the epidemic onset vanishes, meaning
that even a very small fraction of infected elements with small
infective power can spread a disease to a macroscopic part of
the population by a sequence of contagions between neighbors
of the network, as it happens in human contacts [15–18].
Apart from the theoretical value of the above finding, its
direct implications on public health campaigns and the secu-
rity of technological networks such as the Internet demand a
deeper understanding about the influence that diverse contact
patterns have on disease dynamics, its co-evolution [19, 20]
and the design of new algorithms for immunization and vac-
cination policies. Typically, these studies aim at identifying
the most efficient way for reducing the impact of an epidemic
by the vaccination/immunization of the minimal number of
nodes. To this aim, different methods to identify the most im-
portant nodes to be immunized have been proposed [21–24].
The former works concern the immunization of technolog-
ical networks since in social contexts vaccination is typically
voluntary. Thus, the study of the immunization of a popula-
tion demands to include the ways vaccination and risky be-
haviors compete and spread across individuals. To this aim,
one may consider game theory to formulate a social dilemma
in terms of the benefits associated to each of the behaviors:
vaccination or not. Within this framework individuals act ra-
tionally, i.e., by choosing their strategy after an evaluation of
their potential benefits. This evaluation is done by considering
their perception of the risk to contract the disease. For well-
mixed populations recent results show [25–30] that voluntary
vaccination is not efficient to reach efficient immunization.
However, this kind of approach was generalized to networks
[31] unveiling an enhancement of voluntary vaccination.
The former game theoretical approach considers that agents
aim at maximizing their own benefits. However, the deci-
sions of individuals can evolve in time depending on the epi-
demic incidence observed in the population. In this frame-
work agents are prone to adopt the strategies that are expected
to perform better based on the information available. This
evolutionary avenue has been recently adopted to the vacci-
nation dilemma. A first evolutionary avenue is presented in
[32–34] where both disease transmission and vaccinating be-
havior evolve in time simultaneously. The evolution for the
fraction of vaccinated individuals is driven by the difference of
payoffs between vaccinated and non-vaccinated agents (as in
the case of the well-known replicator equation of evolutionary
games [35, 36]), being the latter determined by the epidemic
incidence at that time. A second evolutionary approach is pro-
posed in [37]. In this case, inspired on seasonal influenza, the
number of vaccinated individuals remains constant during the
duration of the influenza season. After each season, individu-
als evaluate the payoffs based on the incidence of the disease
in the last season and decide whether to vaccinate or not for
the next seasons.
Here we take a similar avenue to that of [37] regarding the
dynamical setup and the motivation: the vaccination for sea-
sonal influeza. However, the way in which payoffs are con-
structed and the way individuals choose their strategy follows
2the typical setup of evolutionary games [35, 36]. This setup,
originally presented in [38] for the vaccination dilemma, con-
siders that individuals are assigned a payoff that is solely
based on the personal experience during the last season. In
addition, the strategic choice is based on the imitation of those
individuals with better payoffs. Thus, we do not consider that
individuals follow a rational derivation of the payoffs asso-
ciated to vaccination and risky behavior based on the infor-
mation available. This allow us to connect the vaccination
dilemma with other studies on the evolutionary game dynam-
ics of social dilemmas [35, 36].
In the recent years, the study of the evolutionary game dy-
namics of social dilemmas on structured populations [39–41]
have shown that cooperation (here related to vaccination) is
favored when the interactions among individuals take the form
of scale-free networks [42, 43]. Inspired in this result, in this
work we explore the spread of vaccination behavior across
networks with homogeneous and heterogeneous (scale-free)
connectivity patterns. Our results show that when vaccine is
perfect scale-free networks enhance the vaccination behavior
with respect to homogeneous graphs, thus reducing the impact
of the disease on the population. However, when vaccine is
imperfect we find a cross-over effect, and homogeneous net-
works outperform scale-free ones. This latter scenario reveals
an interesting competition between the rapid spread of both
diseases and cooperative behaviors in scale-free graphs.
II. THE MODEL
As introduced above, to incoporate the competition be-
tween disease spreading and evolutionary dynamics on top of
a network we entangle these two dynamical frameworks by
producing an iterative sequence of a two-stage process. In
both stages the interaction pattern among individuals is de-
scribed by a complex network (keeping the same network
for both the dynamical setups). This network is given by an
(N ×N ) Adjacency matrix Aij so that when two individuals
interact Aij = 1, whereas Aij = 0 otherwise. In this way, the
number ki of neighbors (contacts) of a given node, say i, is
given by ki =
∑N
j=1 Aij .
In this work we will consider two of the most paradigmatic
network models: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graphs [44] and Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) networks [45]. The former class of graphs are
described by a Poisson degree distribution P (k), so that most
of the nodes have a connectivity close to the mean value 〈k〉.
On the other hand, BA networks display a power-law degree
distribution of the form, P (k) ∼ k−3, thus incorporating the
scale-free (SF) property of real-world networks. The imple-
mentation of our dynamical setup aims at revealing the differ-
ences between the heterogeneous degree pattern displayed in
SF and the rather homogeneous structure of ER graphs. To
this aim, for both ER and SF networks, the average connec-
tivity of the nodes is set to 〈k〉 = 6. Below we introduce the
rules governing the two-stage dynamics that it is also sketched
in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: (color online). Resuming sequence of the evolutionary pic-
ture of our model. The top box descibes the epidemic spreading pro-
cess. The bottom one, instead, displays the payoffs accumulated by
the agents according to their strategy. Arrows denote the causal order
of the evolutionary process.
A. Disease spreading
The first of the stages of our dynamical setup is based on
the evolution of a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered
(SEIR) model [4, 5]. This model captures the dynamics of
influenza-type infections. Susceptible nodes have not been in-
fected and are healthy. They catch the disease via direct con-
tact with Exposed neighbors at a rate λ. Exposed nodes are
supposed to carry the virus although they still do not display
symptoms of the disease, thus these individuals are highly in-
fectious during this incubation period. Exposed nodes become
Infected with some rate µ′ which typically is the inverse time
of the incubation period of the disease. Infected nodes, on the
other hand, although still carrying the virus are here assumed
not to be infectious. In particular, we consider that during this
period they remain isolated from the rest of the population.
Finally, Infected nodes pass to the Recovered state with rate µ
that is the inverse duration time of the convalescence period.
With the above rules we consider that each node i interacts
simultaneously with its ki neighbors per unit time. Thus, for a
network described by the Adjacency matrix Aij the effective
probability that a Susceptible node i gets the disease per unit
time is given by:
P iS→E = 1− (1− λ)
∑N
j=1
Aijxj , (1)
where xj = 1 when node j is Exposed and xj = 0 otherwise.
Here, in order to mimic the transmission of ordinary influenza
we have set µ′ = 0.33, since the time elapsed between ex-
posure to the virus and development of symptoms is two to
three days. In addition we take µ = 0.2 since the symptoms
of uncomplicated influenza illness resolve after a period of 3
to 7 days, so that the average permanence in the Infected state
is µ−1 = 5 days.
The addition of vaccinated individuals to the formulation
of our SEIR model implies that initially there is subset of Sus-
ceptible individuals (representing a fraction NV of the total
population) that are less prone to catch the disease than non-
vaccinated Susceptible ones. In particular, we consider that a
3vaccinated individual is infected during a single contact with
an Exposed one at a rate λ · γ, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter
that modulates the quality of the vaccine, being perfect when
γ = 0 and useless for γ = 1. In this way, the probability that
a vaccinated individual i is infected per unit time reads:
P iS→E = 1− (1 − γ · λ)
∑
N
j=1 Aijxj . (2)
Once the values of the epidemic parameters µ and µ′, the
quality γ of the vaccine and the fraction NV of vaccinated in-
dividuals are set, we leave λ as the relevant control parameter
of the SEIR model. In addition, the relevant order parameter
of the dynamics is the fraction R of nodes that got infected
once the epidemic process dies out, so that the macroscopic
behavior is captured by the curve R(λ). For a given value
of λ one starts from an initial state in which a small fraction
(here the 5%) of the population is set as Exposed. Then the
SEIR dynamics is iterated until no individuals remain either
as Exposed or Infected.
B. Evolutionary Dynamics
Once the SEIR dynamics dies out we consider that the sea-
sonal influenza period has passed. Before the next SEIR dy-
namics starts, individuals evaluate whether to vaccinate or
not for the next season. At this point evolutionary dynamics
takes place by assigning to each of the individuals a payoff pii
(i = 1, ..., N ) that depends on their experience accumulated
during the last SEIR propagation. As shown in Fig. 1, there
are four possibilities:
(i) Vaccinated individuals that remain healthy during the
last season have payoff pi = −c (where c is a cost asso-
ciated to the vaccine).
(ii) Vaccinated individuals that were infected during the last
season have payoff pi = −c− TI (where TI is the time
units that the individual remain in the Infected state).
(iii) Individuals that did not vaccinated and remain healthy
during the season have payoff pi = 0.
(iv) Non-vaccinated individuals that were infected are as-
signed a payoff pi = −TI .
The cost c associated to the vaccination is related to differ-
ent issues such as the time spent to get vaccinated (via Public
Health Services) or the probability that the vaccine causes side
effects. To illustrate the vaccination dilemma let us show a
very simple situation of a susceptible agent i in contact with an
exposed agent. In this situation the expected payoff of i when
having taken the vaccine is: piexpV = −(1−γλ)c−γλ(c+1/µ)
(here we assume that TI ≃ 1/µ). On the other hand, if
agent i has adopted a risky behavior, its expected payoff turns
into: piexpNV = −λ/µ. Thus, in this single pairwise encounter,
the rational choice is not to take the vaccine for any costs
c > λ(1 − γ)/µ. This simple situation clearly reveals the
Vaccination Dilemma. However, in a networked population
the situation is rather more complex and, more importantly,
FIG. 2: (color online). The top panel shows the epidemic diagram
〈R〉(λ) for ER and SF networks when vaccination is not allowed.
The bottom panel shows the evolution of the fraction of Recovered
individuals, R, with the generations of the evolutionary dynamics.
The network is SF and the rate of infection per contact is λ = 0.35,
whereas vaccination is perfect γ = 0 and it has a cost c = 0.1.
here we assume that individuals are not fully rational and, in-
stead of deciding their behavior on expectations, they evolve
their strategies based on their previous experience.
Evolutionary dynamics provides the framework to imple-
ment the dynamical evolution of strategies. In particular, as it
is usually done in evolutionary social dilemmas on networks,
each individual, say i, chooses at random one of its first neigh-
bors, say j, and compares their payoffs pii and pij respec-
tively. Then, the probability that agent i takes the strategy
of j, sj , for the next season increases with their payoff differ-
ence, (pij−pii). One of the most used frameworks to calculate
this probability is that of the Fermi-like rule [46, 47], in which
the probability that the strategy of the neighbor j is adopted
by i reads:
Psj→si =
1
1 + exp [−β(pij − pii)]
, (3)
where β is a parameter that allows to span between random
(β ≪ 1) and strong selection (β ≫ 1). Here we adopted β =
1 and checked that our results are quite robust under changes
of β. The update of strategies takes place simultaneously for
all the agents. Once the new strategies are taken, the payoffs
are set to zero and the SEIR dynamics starts again with a new
fraction NV of vaccinated susceptible individuals.
Finally, let us note that we iterate the sequence of the two-
stage process (SEIR dynamics and Evolutionary Dynamics)
for a number of steps (generations) large enough to reach a
steady state for the relevant observables: the average fraction
of recovered, 〈R〉, and vaccinated individuals, 〈NV 〉. In addi-
tion, at the beginning of each generation we randomly assign
the individuals that are vaccinated (so that they constitute the
25% of the population) and those that are initially set as Ex-
posed (reaching the 5% of the total population). It is worth
mentioning that in real cases a small fraction of the popula-
tion gain permanent immunity from the exposure to the virus
in the last generation. In our case we do not consider such
inherited immunity to the new strain
4FIG. 3: (color online). The contour plots show the average fraction of Recovered 〈R〉 (top) and Vaccinated 〈NV 〉 (bottom) individuals as a
function of the infection rate λ and the vaccine quality γ for SF networks. From left to right the panels correspond to different vaccination
costs: c = 0.1 [panels (a) and (d)], c = 0.5 [panels (b) and (e)] and c = 1.0 [panels (c) and (f)]. As the cost increases we note that the overall
fraction of vaccinated individuals decreases while that of Recovered nodes increases. Interestingly when c = 0.1 there is a range of low γ
values (γ < 0.1) for which the epidemic threshold disappears and the disease cannot spread for any value of λ.
III. RESULTS
We start our discussion by briefly reporting the behavior of
the SEIR model without vaccinated individuals. In the top
panel of Fig. 2 we show the average fraction 〈R〉 of recovered
individuals at the end of the SEIR dynamics as a function of
the rate of infection per contact, λ, for ER and SF networks of
N = 1000. From this figure it becomes clear that SF networks
accelerates the onset λc of the epidemic regime as compared
to ER graphs.
Let us now focus on the case of SF networks to evaluate
the impact that voluntary vaccination (under an evolutionary
framework) has on the immunization of the system. In the
bottom panel of Fig. 2 we show the evolution of the fraction
of recovered individuals R for a sequence of 2000 genera-
tions. The rate of infection used in this simulation is set to
λ = 0.35 which, as the top panel shows, corresponds to a
situation in which almost all the population has been infected
〈R〉 ≃ 1 when no vaccination is allowed. Instead, when in-
dividuals can decide whether to take the vaccination (under
the aforementioned evolutionary rules) we show that the epi-
demic phase does not appear (R ≃ 0) since the population has
evolutionarily adopted the vaccination strategy.
Remarkably, the transient regime (lasting around 500 gen-
erations) shows an interesting pattern of rise-and-falls for the
number of recovered individuals R. This behavior points out
that, before vaccination prevails, the population displays an
oscillating behavior between vaccination and risky behavior.
Obviously, when many people vaccinate (falls in R) the epi-
demic falls but vaccinated individuals are tempted not to take
the vaccine due to the higher benefits of risky individuals.
This leads to a progressive increase of the infections (denoted
by the increase of R) that reverse the balance of benefits be-
tween risky and vaccinated individuals. This rise-and-fall be-
havior together with the significative duration of this transient
regime reveal the importance of risk perception in voluntary
vaccination.
A. Macroscopic behavior of vaccine taking in SF networks
Now we analyze the behavior after the transient regime. To
this aim we compute the average fraction of vaccinated 〈NV 〉
and Recovered 〈R〉 individual in the steady state as a func-
tion of λ and the quality γ of the vaccine. For each couple
of values (λ, γ) we have run 100 simulations (each of them
comprising 2000 generations). In Fig. 3 we report these func-
tions for several vaccine costs c in SF networks. In particular,
the panels in the top show the diagrams 〈R〉(λ, γ) and those
in the bottom show 〈NV 〉(λ, γ). From left to right the panels
correspond to the following vaccine costs: c = 0.1, 0.5 and
1.0.
Let us focus on those diagrams corresponding to c = 0.1
[panels (a) and (d)]. The function R(λ, γ) shows that for val-
ues of γ ∈ [0, 0.1] (roughly perfect vaccination) the epidemic
threshold disappears since 〈R〉 ≃ 0 for all the values of λ. In
its turn, we note from panel (d) that for this latter region the
fraction of vaccinated individuals is roughly 〈NV 〉 ≃ 1 except
5for very low values of λ for which the disease cannot spread
even when no immunization is present. If we increase further
the value of γ we recover the epidemic onset λc whose values
decreases as the vaccine get worse, i.e., as γ increases. In ad-
dition, the vaccination behavior decreases so that for a given
value of γ the advantage provided by vaccines is not useful
anymore for λ > λc. Obviously, for γ = 1 we recover the
usual diagram R(λ), shown in the top panel of Fig. 1, for
SF networks since the vaccine provides no advantage and, as
shown in panel (d), almost no individual in the network holds
the vaccination strategy giving 〈NV 〉 ≃ 0 for all λ values.
As we increase the cost of the vaccine to c = 0.5 [panels
(b) and (e)] and c = 1.0 [panels (c) and (f)] we observe that
the overall fraction of Recovered (Vaccinated) individuals in-
creases (decreases). Remarkably, the maximum value of γ for
which there is no epidemic threshold decreases with c and for
c = 1.0 we cannot appreciate this effect. It is interesting to
note that the usual epidemic diagram of SF networks without
immunization is recovered for lower values of γ. For instance,
in panel (b) we note that for γ > 0.6 the curve R(λ) does not
change whereas from panel (e) we note that, within this re-
gion, individuals do not vaccinate anymore (〈NV 〉 = 0).
B. SF versus ER networks: The importance of vaccine quality
Having reported the macroscopic behavior in SF networks
as concerns the influence of the vaccine quality and its cost,
we now focus on the dependence on the networked sub-
strate in which both the disease and the vaccination strategies
spread. To this aim, we compare the behavior in SF and ER
networks in order to measure the role of degree heterogene-
ity on the vaccination behavior. Importantly, we have consid-
ered SF networks as obtained from the Baraba´si-Albert model
[45] after a complete randomization preserving the degree se-
quence of the nodes. In this way, we obtain SF networks with
P (k) ∼ k−3 without any kind of degree-degree correlations
that could influence the dynamical behavior. In addition, we
have increased the size of the networks considered (in order
to fully exploit the heterogeneous property of SF networks) to
N = 104 nodes.
We first explore the case of perfect vaccination, γ = 0. In
Fig. 4 we show the diagrams 〈R〉(λ) (top) and 〈NV 〉(λ) (bot-
tom) for two different vaccination costs: c = 0.5 [panels (a)
and (c)] and c = 1.0 [panels (b) and (d)]. In these panels
we also show the standard deviations around the average val-
ues reported. From the panels we observe that SF networks
outperform ER graphs since the overall average number of
recovered (vaccinated) individuals is smaller (higher) in SF
networks. In particular, the epidemic diagrams 〈R〉(λ) dis-
play a clear peak around the respective epidemic thresholds,
λc, of the original (without vaccination) graphs. Up to this
point λ < λc, the epidemic does not spread and thus vaccina-
tion behavior is not observed either as shown in the diagrams
〈NV 〉(λ). The peak thus point out that the risk is so small that
vaccination behavior do not show up and leading to a burst
of infections which reaches higher values in ER graphs. This
result seems counterintuitive, since from the literature on epi-
FIG. 4: (color online). Epidemic 〈R〉(λ) (top panels) and Vacci-
nation 〈NV 〉(λ) (bottom panels) diagrams for ER and SF networks
(N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6) when the vaccine is perfect (γ = 0). The cost
associated to the vaccine are c = 0.5 (left panels) and c = 1.0 (right
panels).
demic on epidemics on networks, SF graphs are always more
prone to the spread of diseases than ER ones. Furthermore,
from the diagrams 〈NV 〉(λ) we note that the vaccination onset
starts earlier for SF graphs, as their natural epidemic threshold
are smaller than that of ER ones.
For values of λ above the natural epidemic threshold, the
number of Recovered nodes decreases dramatically in both
networks. Here, the risk of infection becomes larger and in-
dividuals start to adopt the vaccination strategy as diagrams
〈NV 〉(λ) in panels (c) and (d) show. However, vaccination be-
havior spreads easier in SF networks than in ER graphs and it
is quite remarkable that, for this regime, the number of Recov-
ered nodes in ER graphs is always (for any value of λ) higher
than in SF networks. Thus cooperative behavior, by taking
the vaccine, spreads better in SF networks, in agreement with
those studies about cooperation and social dilemmas in com-
plex networks [42, 43].
In Fig. 5 we explore the scenario of imperfect vaccination
considering γ = 0.12. This regime shows the competition be-
tween two well-known effects: the aforementioned prevalence
of cooperative behaviors in SF networks (with respect to ER
graphs) and their weakness to the spread of diseases (again
with respect to ER graphs). This competition appears as a
crossover between the behavior of both 〈R〉(λ) and 〈NV 〉(λ)
in SF and ER networks. In panels (a) and (b) we show that
the curves 〈R〉(λ) (after the peak close to the natural epi-
demic thresholds of both networks) cross at some λ∗ values,
which decreases with the cost of the vaccine c. Panels (c) and
(d) show also a crossover behavior for 〈NV 〉(λ), which ap-
pears with some delay with respect to that occurring at λ∗ for
〈R〉(λ). Note that this crossover is well defined since the stan-
6FIG. 5: (color online).Epidemic 〈R〉(λ) (top panels) and Vaccination
〈NV 〉(λ) (bottom panels) diagrams for ER and SF networks (N =
104, 〈k〉 = 6) when the vaccine is not perfect (γ = 0.12). The cost
associated to the vaccine are c = 0.5 (left panels) and c = 1.0 (right
panels). The imperfection of the vaccine causes two crossovers, one
for 〈R〉 and the other one for 〈NV 〉, between the performance of SF
networks and ER graphs.
dard deviations around the average values 〈R〉 and 〈NV 〉 are
extremely low.
The behavior for λ < λ∗ shows the same trend as for
the perfect vaccination case. SF networks outperform ER
graphs showing a larger number of vaccinated individuals and
a smaller number of infections. However, for the imperfect
vaccine (γ > 0) the growth of λ affects both non-vaccinated
and vaccinated individuals. Under such conditions, the virus
finds in the SF networks a better backbone to propagate. In
this way, panels (a) and (b) show that the failure of vaccination
starts to become evident in SF networks at λ∗. The smaller
benefits provided by the imperfection of the vaccine cause that
the number of vaccinated individuals starts to decrease after
λ∗. Being larger the number of infections due to the imper-
fect vaccine in SF networks, as shown for λ > λ∗, the fall of
vaccinated individuals occurs in SF networks at smaller val-
ues of λ than in ER graphs, giving rise to the crossover for
〈NV 〉 shown in panels (c) and (d).
It is quite remarkable that for large λ values and for c = 1.0
[panels (b) and (d)] the number of vaccinated individuals van-
ishes and the values of 〈R〉 goes close to one in a similar way
as in the original network (without vaccination). Obviously,
as the vaccine cost c increases, the solution 〈R〉 ≃ 1 spans
across a larger interval of λ values so that for large enough
c there is no vaccinated individual in the population and one
finally recovers the typical 〈R〉(λ) diagram of Fig. 2.(a).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have analyzed the evolution of voluntary
vaccination in networked populations. At variance with clas-
sical approaches we have considered an evolutionary frame-
work so that individuals facing the vaccination dilemma do
not take the most rational strategy by considering the benefits
associated to each choice. On the contrary, they are consid-
ered as replicating agents that imitate the strategies based on
their previous experience. To this aim we have entangled the
spreading dynamics of an influenza-like disease with an evo-
lutionary framework taking place at the end of each season.
Our results show that when vaccine is perfect (so that vacci-
nated individuals do not get infected) scale-free networks en-
hance both the vaccination behavior and the effective immu-
nization of the population as compared with random graphs
with homogeneous connectivity patterns.
By considering vaccine imperfection we obtain two re-
markable results. First, we have shown that, for scale-free net-
works and low vaccine costs, there is a threshold value for the
vaccine imperfection so that, for values lower than this thresh-
old, vaccination behavior spans across the population and it is
possible to suppress the disease for all the infection proba-
bilities. Instead, when vaccine imperfection becomes large,
agents are less prone to take it and the disease takes advan-
tage of this risky behavior to spread more efficiently across
the population.
The other interesting result concerns the comparison be-
tween scale-free and homogeneous networks. We have shown
that when imperfection appears the better performance of
scale-free network is broken and there is a cross-over effect so
that the number of infected (vaccinated) individuals increases
(decreases) with respect to homogeneous networks when λ is
large enough. This cross-over results from the competition of
two well-known dynamical properties of scale-free networks:
the fast propagation of diseases and the promotion of coop-
erative behaviors. Thus, the ability of scale-free networks in
promoting cooperative behaviors (here represented as paying
the cost of taking vaccine) is threatened when payoffs are de-
pendent on a related dynamical process (here the spreading of
a disease) whose evolution is also affected (here enhanced) by
the heterogeneity of the network.
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